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LET’S CALL IT WHAT IT IS: SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
DISCRIMINATION IS SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII 
INTRODUCTION 
Greater protections for the LGBT+1 community are being recognized with 
increasing frequency, especially after the Supreme Court’s June 2015 decision 
in Obergefell v. Hodges that legalized same-sex marriage.2 In direct contrast to 
this trend, the Trump administration’s Department of Justice recently argued as 
an amicus that employers could fire people for being gay, further arguing that 
current employment discrimination statutes should not be interpreted to prohibit 
sexual orientation discrimination.3 The Justice Department’s argument could 
significantly undermine the Supreme Court’s decision on marriage equality 
because it conflicts with the judiciary’s increased protections for the LGBT+ 
community.4 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has taken the 
stance opposite the Department of Justice, arguing that LGBT+ employees 
should be protected from discrimination under the existing law that prohibits 
employees from being discriminated against on the basis of sex.5 
Fewer than half the states explicitly prohibit workplace discrimination 
against LGBT+ workers. However, many states have enacted laws to explicitly 
protect LGBT+ employees from workplace discrimination.6 Accordingly, it is 
clear that we cannot rely on state law alone to protect the LGBT+ community 
from adverse employment actions in the workplace. Additionally, one survey 
indicated that seventy-six percent of the adult population believed it should be 
 
 1. The author acknowledges that there are many terms used to refer to the diverse 
categorizations of non-heterosexual and non-cisgender individuals. “LGBT+” is used here to 
include all constituencies identifying as non-heterosexual and non-cisgender.  
 2. 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 3. Chris Riotta, Trump Administration Says Employers Can Fire People for Being Gay, 
NEWSWEEK (Sept. 28, 2017, 3:56 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-doj-fired-being-gay-lgbt 
-issues-jeff-sessions-673398 [https://perma.cc/NW6B-4NLP]; Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees at 1, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 
100 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 15-3775), 2017 WL 3277292. 
 4. Riotta, supra note 3.  
 5. What You Should Know about EEOC and the Enforcement Protections for LGBT Workers, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/enforce 
ment_protections_lgbt_workers.cfm [https://perma.cc/7TQC-XHFE] (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
 6. Currently, twenty-two states protect employees in both the private and the public sector 
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, while ten states protect only public 
employees from such discrimination. In Your State, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal. 
org/states-regions/in-your-state [https://perma.cc/2G5R-YFNC] (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
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illegal to discriminate against LGBT+ individuals in the workplace, while sixty-
two percent of the population believes it is already illegal to discriminate against 
LGBT+ individuals in the workplace.7  
Despite these beliefs, there is actually no federal law that explicitly protects 
this group of individuals. Many argue that sexual orientation should be covered 
under Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination.8 While “sex” refers to the 
male or female status assigned at birth,9 sex discrimination has been interpreted 
as encompassing discrimination based on gender as well.10 Gender means “the 
attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that a given culture associates with a person’s 
biological sex.”11 Behaviors that are viewed as incompatible with these 
expectations constitute gender nonconformity.12 The Supreme Court ruled three 
decades ago that employees who experience discrimination based on gender 
nonconformity are protected under Title VII.13 This precedent has led courts to 
apply Title VII’s protections to LGBT+ plaintiffs whose dress, appearance, or 
mannerisms are gender nonconforming.14 However, many courts are struggling 
to interpret Title VII’s protections as extending to the LGBT+ community in the 
workplace when obvious gender nonconformity is absent.15 On the other hand, 
as this Article will discuss more fully below, courts are also struggling to explain 
why sexual orientation discrimination is not inherently sex discrimination.16 
After all, gay and lesbian employees by their very nature violate traditional 
 
 7. Peter Moore, Poll Results: Discrimination, YOUGOV (June 18, 2014, 2:56 PM), 
https://today.yougov.com/topics/legal/articles-reports/2014/06/18/poll-results-discrimination 
[https://perma.cc/HA3P-XB77]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Am. Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender and 
Gender Nonconforming People, 70 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 832, 862 (2015), http://www.apa.org/prac 
tice/guidelines/transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/37X3-F825]. 
 10. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). 
 11. Am. Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Lesbian, Gay, and 
Bisexual Clients, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 10, 11 (2012), http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/features 
/amp-a0024659.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W25-8E7F]. The word “gender” has come to be used 
synonymously with the word “sex” in the law of discrimination. Mary Ann Case, Disaggregating 
Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1995).  
 12. Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra note 11, at 11.  
 13. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–51. 
 14. See, e.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 457 (5th Cir. 2013); Lewis v. 
Heartland Inns, 591 F.3d 1033, 1042 (8th Cir. 2010); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 
864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 15. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Country Music Ass’n., 432 F. App’x 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2011); Dawson 
v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2005); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 
332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 16. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (arguing that 
finding for the plaintiff would have the effect of de facto amending Title VII to encompass sexual 
orientation discrimination). 
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gender norms just by being attracted to others of the same sex.17 These 
conflicting interpretations of sexual orientation discrimination have created a 
split among the federal courts of appeals, resulting in some LGBT+ plaintiffs 
receiving protection while others receive no protection.  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPLIT 
Despite growing support for LGBT+ rights today, this has not always been 
the case. From 1973 until the early 1990s, seventy to seventy-five percent of 
American adults believed that homosexuality was “always wrong.”18 This was 
due, in large part, to the impact of the AIDS epidemic on attitudes towards 
homosexuality.19 Homosexuality was even classified as a mental disorder in the 
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (“DSM”) until 1974.20 It is no surprise, therefore, that courts did not 
initially interpret LGBT+ individuals as belonging to a protected class under 
employment law statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 
VII”). 
TITLE VII 
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual or to discriminate with respect to compensation, terms, 
conditions, or other privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.21 Title VII also makes it unlawful to limit, 
 
 17. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 18. Gregory B. Lewis & Marc A. Rogers, Does the Public Support Equal Employment Rights 
for Gays and Lesbians?, in GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: PUBLIC POLICY, 
PUBLIC OPINION, AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 118, 119–20 (Ellen D. B. Riggle & Barry L. 
Tadlock eds., 1999); Jeni Loftus, America’s Liberalization in Attitudes Toward Homosexuality, 
1973 to 1998, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 762, 767 (2001); TOM W. SMITH, NAT’L OPINION RES. CTR., 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS SEXUAL PERMISSIVENESS: TRENDS, CORRELATES, AND BEHAVIORAL 
CONNECTIONS 3 (1992); Alan S. Yang, The Polls—Trends: Attitudes Towards Homosexuality, 61 
PUB. OPINION Q., 477, 484–85 (1997); ALAN S. YANG, THE 2000 NATIONAL ELECTIONS STUDY 
AND GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS: SUPPORT FOR EQUALITY GROWS 6 (2001). 
 19. Loftus, supra note 18, at 779; Jacqueline Scott, Changing Attitudes to Sexual Morality: A 
Cross-National Comparison, 32 SOCIOLOGY, 815, 820 (1998). 
 20. Position Statement (Retired), Am. Psychological Ass’n, Homosexuality and Sexual 
Orientation Disturbance: Proposed Change in DSM-II, 6th Printing, Page 44, APA Document 
Reference No. 730008 (1973), https://dsm.psychiatryonline.org/doi/pdf/10.1176/appi.books.9780 
890420362.dsm-ii-6thprintingchange [https://perma.cc/YB85-5JS9]. Homosexual individuals 
were not the only group targeted by negative public opinion. In 1980, transgender people were 
officially classified by the American Psychiatric Association as having “gender identity disorder,” 
leading society to believe that transgenderism was something that needed to be cured. See Susan 
Stryker, Transgender Activism, GLBTQ 4 (2015) http://www.glbtqarchive.com/ssh/transgender_ 
activism_S.pdf [https://perma.cc/KDS6-MZEX].  
 21. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
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segregate, or classify employees or applicants in a way that would deprive them 
of employment opportunities or that would adversely affect their employment 
status.22 Although sexual orientation and gender identity are not explicitly listed 
as classes protected by Title VII, the statute’s sex discrimination provision could 
encompass these types of discrimination. 
EARLY CASES 
While today the courts distinguish between gender identity and sexual 
orientation as separate aspects of sexuality, early decisions cached the constructs 
together under a general “sexual preference” umbrella.23 Therefore, the earliest 
cases that attempted to broaden the scope of Title VII to include LGBT+ as a 
protected class under the “sex” prong of the statute focused on what is now 
labeled “gender identity”-based discrimination. Holloway was the first to 
address the issue of whether a transsexual24 employee could claim Title VII 
discrimination on the basis of sex. In Holloway, the plaintiff began female 
hormone treatments shortly after she began employment with Arthur Andersen 
& Co. in 1969.25 Four years later, she was promoted and decided to inform her 
supervisor that she was undergoing treatment in preparation for anatomical sex 
change surgery.26 Despite informing the plaintiff that she may be more 
comfortable working at a company where her sex assigned at birth was 
unknown, Holloway’s supervisor gave her a pay raise.27 However, Holloway 
was terminated shortly afterward when she requested that her records be 
changed to reflect her updated first name.28 The court was hard-pressed to look 
beyond the explicit text of Title VII, arguing that Congress had only the 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. This outlook is consistent with the public’s lack of understanding of the difference between 
the terms “sex” and “gender” in the 1950s to the 1970s, as well as leaders’ and organizers’ struggle 
to address the different concerns and identity issues of gay men, women identifying as lesbians, 
and others identifying as gender variant or nonbinary. See generally Milton Diamond, Sex, Gender, 
and Identity over the Years: A Changing Perspective, 13 CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC 
CLINICS OF N. AM. 591 (2004); Bonnie Morris, History of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and 
Transgender Social Movements, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/re 
sources/history.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y8YU-GTPH] (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
 24. The term “transsexual” is used in this section because this represents the explicit language 
used by the courts during this time period. “Transsexual” is now considered an older term and is 
preferred by some people who have permanently changed, or who seek to change, their bodies 
through medical interventions such as hormones and/or surgeries. GLAAD Media Reference Guide 
– Transgender, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender [https://perma.cc/XH4R-
2HJG] (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
 25. Holloway v. Arthur & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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traditional notions of “sex” in mind when the statute was enacted.29 The court 
justified its reasoning by stating that several bills had been introduced to amend 
the Civil Rights Act to prohibit discrimination against “sexual preference,” but 
that none had been enacted into law.30 As a result, the court refused to extend 
Title VII’s application in the absence of further Congressional action.31  
Around the same time that Holloway was decided, LGBT+ plaintiffs 
attempting to find relief for discrimination based on their sexual orientation 
under Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition were equally unsuccessful. In 
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the employer refused to hire a male 
employee because he was “effeminate.”32 Smith argued that Title VII forbids an 
employer to reject a job applicant based on his or her affectional or sexual 
preference, but the Fifth Circuit disagreed, refusing to extend Title VII’s 
prohibition of sex discrimination without a further Congressional mandate 
explicitly protecting sexual preference.33 
One year later, the Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of Smith in DeSantis 
v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.34 DeSantis encompassed three separate 
federal district court actions claiming that employers had discriminated against 
plaintiffs because of their homosexuality.35 Consistent with other circuits’ 
attention to the explicit language of the statute, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
Congress had only the traditional notions of “sex” in mind.36 Therefore, it 
refused to expand Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination to discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.37 
Six years later, there was a brief glimmer of hope for the transsexual 
community when the Northern District of Illinois found for a transsexual 
plaintiff under Title VII.38 In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff, a 
Vietnam war veteran and licensed pilot, was fired by Eastern Airlines after she 
returned to work following sex reassignment surgery.39 The district court 
determined that the definition of “sex” extends beyond the traditional male-
female dichotomy and also includes questions of one’s own self-perception, as 
well as society’s perception of the individual.40 Judge Grady went on to state 
that “sex is not a cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes . . . the term, ‘sex,’ . . . 
 
 29. Id. at 662. 
 30. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662. 
 31. Id. at 663. 
 32. 569 F.2d 325, 326 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 33. Id. at 326–27. 
 34. DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 35. Id. at 328. 
 36. Id. at 329. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 840 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev’d, 742 F.2d 1081 
(7th Cir. 1984). 
 39. Id. at 827. 
 40. Id. at 823. 
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can be and should be reasonably interpreted to include among its denotations the 
question of sexual identity,” thereby providing Title VII protections to 
transsexuals.41 Consequently, the district court held that regardless of whether 
Ulane was regarded as a transsexual or as a female, she was discharged by 
Eastern Airlines because of her sex in violation of Title VII.42 However, the 
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, applying similar analysis to that 
utilized by the Ninth Circuit in Holloway—refusing to define sex in any way 
other than the rudimentary male-female dichotomy.43 Specifically, the court 
stated that the words of Title VII do not outlaw discrimination against a person 
who has a sexual identity disorder, and that a prohibition against discrimination 
based on an individual’s sex is not synonymous with a prohibition based on an 
individual’s sexual identity disorder or discountenance with the sex into which 
they were born.44 The court stated that “even if one believes that a woman can 
be so easily created from what remains of a man, that does not decide this case” 
because Ulane was discriminated against for her transsexual status rather than 
for being female.45 
Courts relied exclusively on this narrow interpretation of Title VII 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. However, by the late 1980s, courts began to 
apply the theory of sex stereotyping as evidence that discrimination against 
LGBT+ employees was sex discrimination, reasoning that because LGBT+ 
people may fail to conform to what society’s gender norms would dictate is 
appropriate, their discrimination was sex discrimination prohibited under Title 
VII. 
SEX STEREOTYPES AND SUPREME COURT ACTION 
In 1989, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, first accepted sex 
stereotyping as discrimination under Title VII in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.46 
Ann Hopkins worked at Price Waterhouse’s Office of Government Services for 
five years when the partners in her office proposed her as a candidate for 
partnership—the only woman out of eighty-eight other employees proposed for 
partnership that year.47 Some of the partners reacted negatively to Hopkins, 
describing her as “macho,” “overcompensat[ing] for being a woman,” and 
 
 41. Id. at 825. 
 42. Id. at 840. 
 43. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 1087. This further demonstrates the negative attitudes towards transsexuals during 
this time period. See generally Diamond, supra note 23. 
 46. 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (plurality opinion) superseded in part by statute on other 
grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012), as recognized in 
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 213 & n.4 (2014). 
 47. Id. at 233. 
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needing a “course at charm school.”48 When Hopkins’s candidacy for partner 
was placed on hold, she was advised to “walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear 
jewelry.”49 A plurality of the Court concluded that Congress’ intent to forbid 
employers from taking gender into account in making employment decisions 
appears on the face of the statute, and that “common sense” should not be left at 
the doorstep when interpreting the statute.50 The plurality further stated that in 
the context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief 
that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the 
basis of gender.51 In other words, the plurality opinion expanded the meaning of 
sex discrimination beyond the narrow, strictly biological definition of Title VII’s 
sex discrimination prohibition and interpreted the statute to strike at the “entire 
spectrum” of disparate treatment of men and woman resulting from sex 
stereotypes.52 
When an employee’s appearance or actions are perceived to be gender 
nonconforming and serve as the basis for an adverse employment action, this 
discrimination consistently falls under the Price Waterhouse reasoning and is 
prohibited under Title VII. For instance, the Eighth Circuit used a sex 
stereotyping theory to find for the plaintiff under Title VII in Lewis v. Heartland 
Inns when Brenna Lewis was deemed not a “good fit” for the front desk, despite 
receiving positive reviews from her managers and customers.53 Her supervisor’s 
stated reasons included that Lewis’ appearance was “slightly more masculine” 
and that she had an “Ellen DeGeneres kind of look” and lacked the “Midwestern 
girl look.”54 Quoting Price Waterhouse, the Eighth Circuit concluded that “we 
are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or 
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group.”55 
Sex stereotyping theories have also been used as a basis for sex 
discrimination in cases where the plaintiff is berated for exhibiting gender 
nonconformity. For example, in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 
the plaintiff, a server at one of the defendant’s restaurants, was subjected to a 
relentless campaign of insults, name-calling, and vulgarities about his feminine 
 
 48. Id. at 235. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 239, 241. 
 51. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (plurality opinion). 
 52. Id. at 251. The Price Waterhouse decision has not only applied to cases to cases of sexual 
orientation discrimination, but also to cases involving gender identity. See Smith v. City of Salem, 
378 F.3d 566, 567–68 (6th Cir. 2004); EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 
560, 572 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 53. 591 F.3d 1033, 1035–36 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 54. Id. at 1036. 
 55. Id. at 1042 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251). 
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appearance.56 Male coworkers and a supervisor repeatedly referred to the 
plaintiff using the pronouns “she” and “her” and mocked him for walking and 
carrying his serving tray “like a woman.”57 The Ninth Circuit held that this 
verbal abuse occurred because of sex, and applied the Price Waterhouse logic 
found in Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., that “just as a woman can 
ground an action on a claim that men discriminated against her because she did 
not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity, a man can ground a claim on 
evidence that other men discriminated against him because he did not meet 
stereotyped expectations of masculinity.”58 
In a similar set of circumstances, the Fifth Circuit found in EEOC v. Boh 
Brothers Construction Company that the plaintiff, Woods, was protected under 
Title VII when his coworkers referred to him with demeaning and vulgar 
language, such as “princess” and “faggot.”59 In addition to verbal comments, 
Woods’ coworkers also took physical actions, such as approaching Woods from 
behind and simulating intercourse with him.60 The court reasoned that there was 
enough evidence to support the conclusion that Woods’ harassment was because 
of sex.61 Specifically, Woods’ coworkers thought that Woods was not a “manly-
enough man,” and this perception and associated harassment were sufficient to 
support a Title VII sex discrimination claim on the basis of gender 
nonconformity.62  
In other cases, courts have failed to find for employees when an employee’s 
discrimination was strictly on the basis of sexual orientation stereotypes as 
opposed to sex stereotypes. Although there is substantial overlap between sexual 
orientation and gender nonconformity claims, courts have found that certain 
aspects of a worker’s sexual orientation may create a target for discrimination 
apart from any issues related to gender.63 Discrimination may be based on 
prejudicial or stereotypical ideas about the gay and lesbian lifestyle, such as 
promiscuity, religious beliefs, spending habits, child rearing, sexual practices, 
or politics.64 For instance, in Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., Hamm 
was called a “faggot,” “bisexual,” and “girl scout,” and a coworker threatened 
to snap his neck.65 Another coworker threatened to “shove [a] water hose up 
[Hamm’s] ass,” and Hamm stated that management believed he was “that 
 
 56. 256 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 874 (quoting Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st 
Cir. 1999)). 
 59. 731 F.3d 444, 449, 478 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 60. Id. at 449. 
 61. Id. at 457. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 709 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 64. Id. 
 65. 332 F.3d 1058, 1060 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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way.”66 The court found that even after drawing all reasonable inference in 
Hamm’s favor, his experiences were either related to his coworkers’ disapproval 
of his work performance or their perceptions of Hamm’s sexual orientation, 
neither of which fit under the protection of sex discrimination based on gender 
nonconformity.67 
The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Dawson v. Bumble & 
Bumble.68 Dawson was a self-described lesbian female who did not conform to 
gender norms or meet the stereotyped expectations of femininity.69 At the hair 
salon in which she worked, fellow stylists would harass her about her appearance 
and the fact that she did not conform to the image of a woman, often calling her 
“Donald” and joking that she was “wearing her sexuality like a costume.”70 The 
court concluded that Dawson’s claims of sex stereotyping did not in fact derive 
from sex stereotypes, but rather from stereotypes based on sexual orientation, 
and therefore were not cognizable under Title VII.71 
The same reasoning was used six years later in the Sixth Circuit’s decision 
in Gilbert v. Country Music Ass’n.72 Gilbert, who worked for the Country Music 
Association was openly homosexual.73 While preparing for a show, a union 
worker called him a “faggot” and threatened to stab him.74 The particular worker 
in question was even facing criminal charges for having stabbed several 
homosexuals elsewhere.75 Gilbert attempted to raise a claim of sex 
discrimination under the theory of gender nonconformity, but the court labeled 
this as a “formulaic recitation” of the elements of a sex stereotyping cause of 
action, which by itself would not rise to the level of protection under Title VII.76 
Instead, the court determined that Gilbert’s allegations involved “discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, nothing more.”77  
Price Waterhouse and the cases that followed demonstrated that gender 
nonconformity can serve as a basis for sex discrimination when an employee 
faces discrimination on the basis of obvious gender nonconformity, but not when 
an employee fails to display gender nonconforming behaviors or when 
discrimination arises primarily on the basis of sexual orientation stereotypes. In 
other words, employees who experienced discrimination based on apparent 
 
 66. Id. at 1061. 
 67. Id. at 1062. 
 68. 398 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 69. Id. at 213. 
 70. Id. at 215. 
 71. Id. at 216. 
 72. 432 F. App’x 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 73. Id. at 518. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 520. 
 77. Gilbert, 432 F. App’x at 520. 
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gender nonconforming behaviors may be successful on their Title VII sex 
discrimination claim, whereas those who experience discrimination as a result 
of purely being homosexual would not. After Price Waterhouse and subsequent 
cases set the standard for sex stereotyping as a theory of sex discrimination under 
Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) 
published its interpretation of Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition as 
applied to cases of gender identity and sexual orientation, and some courts 
ultimately responded by adopting the agency’s position. 
EEOC GUIDELINES 
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is an administrative 
agency responsible for the enforcement of Title VII and various other 
employment discrimination statutes.78 While the EEOC cannot issue regulations 
under Title VII with the force of law, it is authorized to issue interpretive or 
procedural guidance on how employers should comply with the laws it 
enforces.79 However, there is some evidence that the Supreme Court defers to 
the EEOC less frequently than other federal agencies.80 In addition to publishing 
interpretive guidance, the EEOC also adjudicates appeals from administrative 
decisions made by federal agencies on EEOC complaints.81  
The EEOC interprets and enforces Title VII’s prohibition of sex 
discrimination as forbidding employment discrimination based on gender 
identity or sexual orientation, even if allowed by state or local laws.82 The EEOC 
explicitly states that it has not recognized any new protected characteristics 
under Title VII.83 Rather, the Commission has applied existing Title VII 
precedents to sex discrimination claims raised by LGBT+ individuals, 
interpreting the statute’s sex discrimination provision as prohibiting 
discrimination against employees on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
 
 78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012) (enforcement authority codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e-4, e-5, e-12). See also Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d), 209, 211, 213, 215–19, 255–56, 
259–60, 262 (2012); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012) 
(enforcement authority codified at 29 U.S.C. § 628); Americans with Disabilities Act, tit. 1, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12111–17 (2012) (enforcement authority codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12117); Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 §§ 501, 505, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794, 794a (2012) (enforcement authority codified at 
29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(1)). 
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identity.84 The EEOC has ruled in favor of plaintiffs in cases of both transgender 
discrimination85 and sexual orientation discrimination86 on the basis, namely, 
that claims of discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation 
necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII.87 
This paper focuses on sexual orientation discrimination specifically because “a 
person is defined as transgender precisely because of the perception that his or 
her behavior transgresses gender stereotypes.”88 Thus, while there is a 
congruence between discriminating against transgender individuals and 
discrimination on the basis of gender-based behavioral norms,89 this overlap is 
not necessarily as apparent or consistent for gay and lesbian individuals.90 This 
lack of overlap has resulted in inconsistently applied law for gay and lesbian 
employees in particular. 
As the cases and EEOC Guidelines above illustrate, there is a consistency 
among the circuits in finding for plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claims when 
issues of gender nonconformity and sex stereotyping are involved. However, 
circuits disagree on the extension of Title VII’s protections when the case 
involves stereotypes based purely on sexual orientation as opposed to sex. 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
While LGBT+ plaintiffs could bring claims as sex stereotyping cases, the 
cases were routinely dismissed if the claims were actually sexual orientation 
discrimination claims. In other words, courts were unwilling to extend Title 
VII’s sex discrimination prohibition to cover sexual orientation discrimination 
per se. Simonton v. Runyon is one such case.91 Simonton, a known homosexual 
male employee of the United States Postal Service, endured a series of explicit 
and indecent verbal assaults from coworkers.92 Notes were placed on the wall in 
the employees’ bathroom with Simonton’s name and the name of celebrities who 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., Lusardi v. McHugh, EEOC Decision No. 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756 (April 
1, 2015); Eric S. v. Shinseki, EEOC Decision No. 0120133123, 2014 WL 1653484 (Apr. 16, 2014); 
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v. Holder, EEOC Decision No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (April 20, 2012). 
 86. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (July 15, 
2015). 
 87. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 5. 
 88. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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 92. Id. at 34–35. 
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had died of AIDS.93 In addition, pornographic photographs were taped to his 
work area, male dolls were placed in his vehicle, and copies of Playgirl magazine 
were sent to his home.94 Simonton’s coworkers also hung posters that stated that 
Simonton suffered from a mental illness.95 Despite the extreme discrimination 
Simonton faced, the Second Circuit reasoned that Congress’s refusal to expand 
the reach of Title VII is strong evidence of congressional intent in the face of 
consistent judicial decisions refusing to interpret “sex” to include sexual 
orientation.96 The court further stated that “sex” under Title VII can logically 
only refer to “membership in a class delineated by gender, rather than sexual 
activity regardless of gender.”97 The court admitted that Simonton may have 
found relief under Title VII under a sex stereotyping theory, but that they did 
not have a basis in the record to surmise that Simonton behaved in a 
stereotypically feminine manner and that the discrimination he experienced was, 
in fact, based on his nonconformity with gender norms instead of his sexual 
orientation.98 
In an attempt to further distinguish between gender and sexual activity, the 
Sixth Circuit refused to find for an employee who faced discrimination as a 
result of his association with another employee at work. In Vickers v. Fairfield 
Medical Center, the male plaintiff befriended a homosexual male doctor.99 Once 
his coworkers found out about the friendship, they began to make sexually based 
slurs and discriminating comments about Vickers, alleging that he was gay and 
questioning his masculinity.100 Fellow employees also placed chemicals in 
Vickers’ food, called him vulgar nicknames, and repeatedly grabbed his crotch 
with a tape measure, among other obscene behaviors.101 The court did not extend 
Price Waterhouse’s gender nonconformity theory to Vickers because the 
harassment arose based on Vickers’ perceived homosexuality and friendship 
with a known homosexual man as opposed to gender nonconforming behaviors 
observed at work.102 The dissent asserted that the majority made an artificial 
distinction between behavior and appearances in the workplace and private 
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 96. Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35. 
 97. Id. at 36 (quoting DeCintio v. Westchester Cty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306–07 (2d Cir. 
1986)). 
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conduct, arguably because they could not distinguish between sexual orientation 
discrimination and sex discrimination.103 
Courts have also refused to allow sex stereotyping theories to serve as a 
basis for Title VII discrimination for employees who are openly homosexual. In 
Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, Evans worked at a hospital as a security 
officer for over a year until she left voluntarily.104 While working at the hospital, 
Evans was denied equal pay or work, harassed, and physically assaulted and 
battered.105 Before leaving voluntarily, she was targeted for termination for not 
carrying herself in a “traditional womanly manner.”106 Although she did not 
broadcast her sexuality, it was “evident” because of how she presented herself 
(having a male uniform, low male haircut, shoes, etc.).107 Evans asserted that her 
status as a lesbian supported her claim of sex discrimination because 
discrimination against someone for her orientation often coincided with 
discrimination for gender nonconformity.108 The Eleventh Circuit concluded 
that Evans did not provide enough facts to suggest that her decision to present 
herself in a masculine manner led to the adverse employment actions, and it 
refused to find for Evans on her sexual orientation discrimination claim without 
sufficient gender nonconformity evidence as consistent with other circuits.109  
Throughout the beginning of 2017, courts reverted to an essentially pre-
Price Waterhouse interpretation of Title VII, relying heavily on the narrow 
interpretations of “sex” in the statute in failing to interpret its protections as 
extending to sexual orientation discrimination. However, this interpretation 
changed and broadened once again in the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Hively in 
April 2017. 
THE IMPACT OF HIVELY 
Kimberly Hively began teaching as a part-time adjunct professor at Ivy Tech 
Community College in 2000.110 Although Hively met the necessary 
qualifications for full-time employment and had never received a negative 
 
 103. Id. at 766–70 (Lawson, J., dissenting). The majority in Vickers expressed a concern that 
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 109. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1254, 1256. On September 7, 2017, Lambda Legal Defense and 
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performance evaluation, the college refused to interview her for any of the six 
full-time positions for which she applied between 2009 and 2014.111 
Furthermore, her part-time employment contract was not renewed in 2014.112 
Hively alleged that she had been “denied full-time employment and promotions 
based on her sexual orientation,” which she argued violated Title VII.113 The 
college, in turn, argued that Title VII does not apply to claims of sexual 
orientation discrimination and that Hively was therefore not entitled to any legal 
remedy.114 The court sided with the employer, citing a body of Seventh Circuit 
precedent binding their decision.115 Interestingly, the court even cited the pre-
Price Waterhouse Seventh Circuit Ulane case, returning to the plain meaning of 
the word “sex” as encompassing discrimination against women only because 
they are women and against men only because they are men.116 Despite 
acknowledging that “it is exceptionally difficult to distinguish between [claims 
of gender nonconformity and claims of sexual orientation],” the court ultimately 
concluded that it is not impossible and that there may indeed be some aspects of 
a worker’s sexual orientation that create a target for discrimination apart from 
any issues related to gender.117 Because Hively only alleged discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, the court was bound by its prior precedent in 
interpreting Title VII as encompassing her discrimination claim in the absence 
of a Supreme Court opinion or new legislation.118 
Although it appeared at first that the Seventh Circuit was going to rule in 
accordance with its own prior precedent in limiting the scope of Title VII claims 
only to those that sufficiently plead gender nonconformity and sex stereotyping, 
the plaintiff’s petition for rehearing en banc was granted, and the Seventh Circuit 
gathered one year later to review the 2016 panel decision.119 The en banc opinion 
used the panel’s acknowledgement of the difficulty in separating gender 
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 115. Hively, 830 F.3d at 700–01 (citing Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 
224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 
2000) (both holding that harassment based solely upon a person’s sexual preference or orientation, 
and not one’s sex, is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII); Muhammed v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 767 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing the holding in Spearman, 231 F.3d at 
1085); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003) (Refusing 
to extend Title VII’s protections to claims of harassment based on an individual’s sexual 
orientation); Shroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 2002) (Holding that Title 
VII does not provide for a private right of action based on sexual orientation discrimination)). 
 116. Hively, 830 F.3d at 700 (citing Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th 
Cir. 1984)). 
 117. Hively, 830 F.3d at 705, 709. 
 118. Id. at 718. 
 119. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2018] LET’S CALL IT WHAT IT IS 147 
nonconformity claims from sexual orientation claims to conclude that sexual 
orientation claims fall within Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination 
if the claim affects employment in one of the statutorily specified ways.120 In 
justifying this reasoning, the court concluded that the discriminatory behavior 
does not exist without taking the victim’s biological sex into account.121 The 
court stated that “[a]ny discomfort, disapproval, or job decision based on the fact 
that the complainant— woman or man— dresses differently, speaks differently, 
or dates or marries a same-sex partner, is a reaction purely and simply based on 
sex.”122 In other words, the court believed that “Hively represents the ultimate 
case of failure to conform to the female stereotype (at least as understood in a 
place such as modern America, which views heterosexuality as the norm and 
other forms of sexuality as exceptional): she is not heterosexual.”123 
Hively was a groundbreaking ruling for LGBT+ employees as the first case 
that acknowledged that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination. 
One year after Hively was decided, the Second Circuit followed the Seventh 
Circuit’s reasoning when it decided Zarda v. Altitude Express.124 In Zarda, 
Donald Zarda was a homosexual man working for Altitude Express, a skydiving 
company.125 Zarda typically informed female customers that he was homosexual 
so that they would feel more comfortable when they were strapped closely to 
him while skydiving.126 However, when a male customer found out about 
Zarda’s disclosure of his homosexuality to his girlfriend, the male customer 
called Altitude Express and complained about Zarda’s behavior.127 Zarda was 
subsequently fired, allegedly for failing to provide an enjoyable experience for 
a customer.128 Zarda attempted to make a sex stereotyping claim by arguing that 
his employer criticized him for wearing pink clothes and nail polish at work.129 
The district court concluded that Zarda failed to establish the “requisite 
proximity” between his termination and his proffered instances of gender 
nonconformity and granted summary judgment on Zarda’s Title VII claim, 
following the precedent set by Simonton on failing to recognize sexual 
orientation discrimination claims in and of themselves under Title VII.130 The 
Second Circuit did not reanalyze this issue on appeal, as it was not alleged by 
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Zarda.131 Thus, Zarda could only receive a new trial if Title VII’s prohibition of 
sex discrimination encompassed discrimination based on sexual orientation – a 
result foreclosed by Simonton.132  
While the Second Circuit panel could not overrule prior precedent, the court 
granted a rehearing en banc in February 2018 and subsequently did overrule 
Simonton.133 Sitting en banc, the Second Circuit articulated three theories 
outlined in the EEOC’s decision in Baldwin to explain why sexual orientation is 
sex discrimination.134 First, sexual orientation discrimination is discrimination 
because of sex because sexual orientation is defined with explicit reference to 
sex.135 In fact, sexual orientation is doubly delineated by sex because it is 
defined by both a person’s sex and the sex of those to whom he or she is 
attracted.136 “[B]ecause sexual orientation is a function of sex and sex is a 
protected characteristic under Title VII, it follows that sexual orientation is also 
protected.”137 Second, it is “simply impossible” to disentangle sexual orientation 
from sex because beliefs about sexual orientation necessarily take sex into 
consideration.138 Therefore, it makes no difference that the employer may not 
believe that its actions are based on sex.139 Finally, sexual orientation 
discrimination is a form of associational discrimination.140 “[I]f a male 
employee married to a man is terminated because his employer disapproves of 
the same-sex marriage, the employee has suffered associational discrimination 
based on his own sex because ‘the fact that the employee is a man instead of a 
woman motivated the employer’s discrimination against him.’”141 Based on this 
reasoning, the Second Circuit concluded that Zarda was entitled to bring a Title 
VII claim for discrimination based on sexual orientation and remanded the case 
for further proceedings.142 
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The en banc rulings in Hively and Zarda were celebrated wins for the 
LGBT+ community,143 but the rulings are not the “be all and end all” of sexual 
orientation discrimination claims under Title VII. Courts outside the Seventh 
and Second Circuits are still free to limit the scope of Title VII’s sex 
discrimination prohibition to include only purely sex-based discrimination and 
discrimination under theories of sex stereotyping. In other words, an 
interpretation gap remains between the Seventh and Second Circuits on one end 
and the remaining circuits on the other. 
THE REMAINING GAP 
Hively—and subsequently Zarda—broadened Title VII’s sex discrimination 
prohibition further than any other court had in the past by interpreting it to 
encompass sexual orientation-based discrimination claims— even without 
framing the case as a sex stereotyping case. However, this does not mean that 
LGBT+ employees in other circuits are protected against discrimination under 
Title VII. Instead, plaintiffs in these jurisdictions must sufficiently plead their 
LGBT+ discrimination claims as falling under the theory of sex stereotyping in 
order to make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII.144 
For instance, in Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, Inc., the Second Circuit—
the same Circuit that initially failed to find for Zarda on his sexual orientation 
discrimination claim—found for a homosexual plaintiff employee on a sex 
stereotyping theory just three weeks prior to the Zarda panel decision.145 One 
primary difference between Christiansen and Zarda is that Christiansen’s 
complaint alleged multiple instances of sex stereotyping discrimination.146 
While the district court opined that permitting Christiansen’s Title VII claim to 
proceed “would obliterate the line the Second Circuit has drawn, rightly or 
wrongly, between sexual orientation and sex-based claims,”147 the appellate 
division concluded that “gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals do not have less 
protection under Price Waterhouse against traditional gender stereotype 
discrimination than do heterosexual individuals.”148 In other words, LGBT+ 
employees are not automatically exempt from Title VII protections—even 
outside of the Seventh and Second Circuits—so long as they can prove that acts 
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of gender nonconformity are a substantial factor in their experiences of 
employment discrimination. 
In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Katzmann (joined by Judge Brodie) 
argued that “sexual orientation discrimination is often, if not always, motivated 
by a desire to enforce heterosexually defined gender norms.”149 The concurrence 
stated that the current approach to sex stereotype claims is unworkable for 
numerous district courts throughout the country.150 This is because such cases 
present fact-finders with the exceptionally difficult task of deciding whether a 
plaintiff’s perceived masculinity/femininity or a plaintiff’s sexual orientation 
was the true cause of the disparate treatment—a task made even more 
challenging when considering the degree to which sexual orientation is 
commingled with particular traits associated with gender.151 The concurrence 
urged the Second Circuit to reexamine its previous decisions holding that sexual 
orientation discrimination claims are not cognizable under Title VII,152 which it 
ultimately did in the Zarda en banc opinion.153 However, Judges Katzmann and 
Brodie accept that it may be the Supreme Court that ultimately must address the 
issue once and for all.154 
Apart from the gender nonconformity framing, employees are currently 
afforded no protections outside of the Seventh and Second Circuits for sexual 
orientation discrimination. As a result of Hively and Zarda, employees working 
in the Seventh and Second Circuits are now afforded greater protections than 
those working outside of those circuits. This is leading many to question exactly 
how Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition should be interpreted and applied. 
CORRECT INTERPRETATION 
As the analysis to this point shows, the circuits are currently conflicted on 
the interpretation of Title VII’s sex discrimination protections. The Eleventh 
Circuit’s ruling for the employer in Evans is in direct conflict with the Seventh 
Circuit’s Hively decision, the Second Circuit’s Zarda decision, and with the 
EEOC Guidelines. Furthermore, the employer in Zarda has a pending certiorari 
petition before the Supreme Court.155 Altitude Express has urged the Supreme 
Court to “address the growing uncertainty” stemming from both the circuit split 
and the split between the EEOC and the Department of Justice.156 In other 
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words, the issue of Title VII protections for LGBT+ employees is ripe for 
Supreme Court intervention. It is time that the Supreme Court rule on this issue 
once and for all and call sexual orientation discrimination what it really is: sex 
discrimination. 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION SHOULD BE PROTECTED UNDER 
TITLE VII 
The current split in the interpretation of Title VII’s application to sexual 
orientation discrimination is confusing and inconsistent. There are several 
reasons why the Supreme Court should resolve this ambiguity and rule that 
sexual orientation discrimination is protected under Title VII. Namely, (1) it is 
impossible to separate sexual orientation from gender nonconformity, (2) the 
inclusion of sexual orientation discrimination will make the application of Title 
VII clearer and easier for courts, (3) a failure to protect employees from sexual 
orientation discrimination is confusing for employers, and (4) the current state 
of the law is confusing for and unfair to employees. 
1. It is impossible to separate sexual orientation from gender 
nonconformity. 
First, it is patently impossible to separate sexual orientation from gender 
nonconformity. The Supreme Court extended Title VII’s protections to cases of 
gender nonconformity in 1989 in its Price Waterhouse decision.157 Yet, three 
decades later, sexual orientation is still not universally protected under the 
statute despite the fact that it is greatly intertwined with gender nonconformity 
and relies on the same underlying theory of Title VII protection.158 In other 
words, the fact that a plaintiff frames his or her complaint in terms of sexual 
orientation discrimination instead of gender stereotyping discrimination is 
“immaterial.”159 Judge Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York stated 
it best when he said: 
[When a] plaintiff has stated a claim for sexual orientation discrimination, 
“common sense” dictates that he has also stated a claim for gender stereotyping 
discrimination, which is cognizable under Title VII. . . . I decline to embrace an 
“illogical” and artificial distinction between gender stereotyping discrimination 
and sexual orientation discrimination, and in so doing, I join several other courts 
throughout the country.160 
Judge Hellerstein’s view is consistent with Judges Katzmann and Brodie in their 
Christensen concurrence: “‘[S]tereotypical notions about how men and women 
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should behave will often necessarily blur into ideas about heterosexuality and 
homosexuality.’ . . . [I]t is logically untenable for us to insist that this particular 
gender stereotype is outside of the gender stereotype discrimination prohibition 
articulated in Price Waterhouse.”161 
Despite this reasoning, the same circuit came to a different conclusion just 
weeks before in the Zarda panel decision when it concluded that Zarda failed to 
establish the requisite proximity between his termination and his failure to 
conform to gender stereotypes.162 Sitting en banc, the Second Circuit overruled 
the panel decision, finding that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
is sex discrimination.163 This further evidences the muddied waters between 
purely sexual orientation claims and gender nonconformity claims and again 
reaffirms the need to stop trying to draw a line where one does not exist.164  
Furthermore, an adoption of Hively’s interpretation of the cognizability of 
sexual orientation claims under Title VII would eliminate the practice of finding 
against an employee for “bootstrapping” their sexual orientation claims with sex 
stereotype claims. This is precisely why Zarda was initially unsuccessful in 
proving his discrimination claim—although he alleged both sexual orientation 
discrimination and discrimination based on sex stereotyping, he failed to 
effectively prove his case under a theory of sex stereotyping.165 Theoretically, a 
court could also go out of its way to focus narrowly on sexual orientation 
stereotypes as opposed to sex stereotypes to avoid finding for the plaintiff on the 
basis of sexual orientation discrimination.166 Such may have been the case for 
Zarda in his initial case, as he was described as having a “typically masculine 
demeanor” despite being openly homosexual.167 If sexual orientation 
discrimination was covered under Title VII, plaintiffs like Zarda would have a 
much better chance at proving their case. If heterosexual orientation is a sex 
stereotype per se, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is literally 
discrimination on the basis of sex. This means that LGBT+ plaintiffs would be 
left to prove that they have experienced an adverse employment action because 
of their sexual orientation (as opposed to another reason such as poor 
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performance or failure to follow company policy) to receive protection under 
Title VII’s sex discrimination provision.168 
The EEOC’s analysis (as applied in the Zarda en banc opinion) of the 
immense overlap of the two concepts also demonstrates that sexual orientation 
discrimination is sex discrimination. In Baldwin v. Foxx, the EEOC held that a 
claim of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily states a 
claim of discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII under three 
theories.169 First, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily 
involves treating an employee differently because of his or her sex.170 Second, 
sexual orientation discrimination is associational discrimination.171 The EEOC’s 
third reason for concluding that sexual orientation discrimination is sex 
discrimination echoes that of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hively—sexual 
orientation discrimination necessarily involves discrimination based on gender 
stereotypes, including employer beliefs about the person to whom the employee 
should be attracted.172 This is reminiscent of Chief Judge Wood’s statement in 
Hively that the plaintiff represented the “ultimate” case of a failure to conform 
to the female stereotype because she was not heterosexual.173 
2. The inclusion of sexual orientation discrimination will make the 
application of Title VII clearer and easier for courts. 
Courts are currently split as to whether sexual orientation discrimination is 
included under Title VII because it is unclear how the sex discrimination 
provision should be interpreted. While some argue that it should only include 
clear cases of sex discrimination and gender nonconformity,174 others argue that 
sexual orientation discrimination and gender nonconformity are essentially one 
and the same.175 Absent consistent protections for sexual orientation 
discrimination, gay and lesbian employees would be forced to litigate their 
claims under the guise of “gender nonconformity” to receive statutory 
 
 168. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (discussing the 
plaintiff’s initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination). 
 169. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *10 (July 15, 
2015). 
 170. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 5. See supra note 135 and 
accompanying text. 
 171. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 5. See supra note 140 and 
accompanying text. 
 172. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 5.  
 173. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 174. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 2017); Christiansen v. Omnicom 
Grp., Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 598, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 175. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 346; Philpott v. New York, 252 F. Supp. 3d 313, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 
2017). 
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protection.176 That is, LGBT+ employees would need to demonstrate that they 
experienced discrimination because of gender nonconformity in their 
mannerisms, appearance, or behavior to receive statutory protection.177 
However, numerous district courts throughout the country have “found this 
approach to gender stereotype claims to be unworkable.”178 Instead of a 
successful route to claiming Title VII protection, the result is a “contradictory” 
and “confused hodgepodge of cases.”179 In other words, the gender 
nonconformity litigation approach does not work for plaintiffs, and it does not 
work for courts.  
Additionally, the existing protection for gender nonconformity claims under 
Price Waterhouse is not always a workaround solution for LGBT+ employees. 
Gender nonconformity claims are especially difficult for gay plaintiffs to 
bring180 and even harder for district courts to adjudicate.181 This likely explains 
why Zarda’s case has been litigated four times and now has a pending certiorari 
petition before the Supreme Court.182 As a result, “litigants and courts should 
not be required to cram cases involving discrimination based on sexual 
orientation into this box.”183 Instead, they should have a more direct route to 
achieving Title VII protection. 
A finding that Title VII encompasses sexual orientation discrimination 
claims, on the other hand, will take the guesswork out of the analysis. In other 
words, courts would not have to determine whether a plaintiff’s sexual 
orientation claim overlaps enough with gender nonconformity to warrant 
protection because the standard simply would be that it does. Instead, courts 
would be left to determine whether the discrimination claim meets the remaining 
criteria of a Title VII sex discrimination claim184 as opposed to grappling with 
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Zarda, No. 17-1623 (filed May 29, 2018). 
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whether the plaintiff is even a member of a protected class to begin with. A 
finding consistent with Hively and Zarda would allow this question to be 
answered more straightforwardly.  
Additionally, the current confusion would not disappear if courts continue 
to side with employers. The confusion lies not with the competing interpretations 
of appellate circuits, but rather with the attempt to disentangle sex stereotypes 
from sexual orientation stereotypes. This will only be resolved if the Supreme 
Court rules that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination. 
3. A failure to protect employees from sexual orientation discrimination 
is confusing for employers. 
The current state of the law is also leaving employers unsure of their legal 
obligations,185 and this confusion will only be perpetuated if sex stereotyping is 
kept distinct from sexual orientation because courts will continue to find 
sometimes for employers and other times for employees, sometimes on nearly 
identical facts. A company that has offices throughout the United States should 
be able to advise management, train supervisors, and inform employees of their 
rights in the same way, yet the current state of affairs precludes such clarity.186 
A finding that sexual orientation discrimination is not sex discrimination, 
which would still leave open the opportunity to litigate claims under a gender 
nonconformity theory of sex discrimination under Title VII,187 would not clear 
this blurred standard. Instead, this would essentially send the message to 
employers that it is lawful to discriminate against an LGBT+ identifying 
employee who conforms to their birth sex, but not an LGBT+ identifying 
employee who exhibits obvious gender nonconformity.188 Imagine the 
implications on diversity training programs, which would come to suggest that 
supervisors should exercise extra caution in making decisions regarding gender 
nonconforming employees, but not employees who are known to identify as 
LGBT+ but otherwise appear to conform to their birth sex.  
 
disparate impact, the plaintiff must show (1) that the employer has a procedure or practice which 
is a barrier to employment opportunities, (2) for member of a protected class (e.g., sex), and (3) 
that barrier had an adverse impact on that protected class, originally set out in race-based 
discrimination cases such as Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and Albermarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), and later applied to sex discrimination cases in Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). See Susan M. Omiliam & Jean P. Kamp, 1 SEX-BASED EMP. 
DISCRIMINATION § 11:10 (2018). 
 185. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Evans, 850 F.3d 248 (No. 17-370). 
 186. Id. at 16. 
 187. For instance, while an effeminate gay man will likely be protected under Title VII, a non-
effeminate gay would probably not be. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–
51 (1989).  
 188. See Case, supra note 11, at 4. 
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Alternatively, an extension of Title VII protections to LGBT+ identifying 
employees would increase not only the law’s clarity, but also its predictability. 
A finding that sexual orientation is protected under Title VII would allow 
companies to function more consistently. It would allow companies to update 
their workplace policies in recognition of Title VII protections of sexual 
orientation and would better inform training programs targeted at inclusion and 
fair treatment of all employees, regardless of their behaviors or preferences. 
4. A failure to protect employees from sexual orientation discrimination 
is confusing for and unfair to employees. 
A finding that sexual orientation discrimination is not sex discrimination 
would not only leave employers confused, it would also leave employees in a 
difficult position, forcing them to choose between protection or potential 
discrimination.189 The current state of sexual orientation discrimination law 
leaves employees in a difficult position as to whether or not they can feel secure 
in revealing their sexual orientation out of fear of discrimination or unfair 
treatment.190 In fact, in some states, LGBT+ employees can now legally get 
married one day, and legally get fired the next.191 Additionally, LGBT+ 
employees who are entitled to insurance and other forms of employment benefits 
for their spouses might exercise caution in revealing their marital status to their 
employer out of fear of revealing their sexual orientation and subjecting 
themselves to termination on that basis.192 
In addition to facing a greater potential for termination, LGBT+ employees 
are also typically paid less and have fewer employment opportunities than their 
heterosexual coworkers.193 LGBT+ employees, particularly those exposed to 
discrimination, are also at risk for poorer physical and mental health—especially 
in jurisdictions where sexual orientation stigma and economic disadvantages run 
highest.194 A decision from the Supreme Court clarifying that Title VII’s 
prohibition of sex discrimination also encompasses sexual orientation 
discrimination would ease the burdens associated with identifying as LGBT+.195 
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The law will only continue to be applied unfairly and inconsistently if the 
Supreme Court finds that sexual orientation discrimination is distinct from sex 
discrimination. Currently, some employees are eligible for Title VII protections, 
while others are not, solely as a result of which jurisdiction’s law is applied in 
their case. For instance, a gay person living in Michigan and working in 
Michigan can be fired at any time based on his sexual orientation.196 However, 
if the gay person lives in Michigan and works in Indiana, he will enjoy greater 
job security, as Indiana is within the Seventh Circuit that decided Hively.197  
Similarly, if an employee living in a Seventh or Second Circuit state has a 
job opportunity or a promotion opportunity in a non-Seventh or non-Second 
Circuit state, the employee would have to choose between advancing their career 
while foregoing Title VII protection or remaining in their current position in the 
protected jurisdiction.198 Federal law should not put people in such a situation.199 
Furthermore, this issue will only be resolved if the Supreme Court agrees 
with the Hively and Zarda decisions because plaintiffs will still be free to allege 
sexual orientation discrimination under a gender stereotyping theory per Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.200 In other words, the law would ultimately protect gay 
and lesbian employees who exhibit obvious gender nonconformity in their 
mannerisms, appearance, and behavior, but not those who appear to conform to 
their birth sex.201 Conversely, “plaintiffs who do not look, act, or appear to be 
gender nonconforming but are merely known to be or perceived to be gay or 
lesbian do not fare as well in the federal courts.”202 This was precisely the case 
in Vickers, where the plaintiff was admonished for his perceived homosexuality, 
but did not display enough gender nonconforming behaviors at work to 
successfully claim Title VII protection.203 Unfortunately, Vickers is not alone; 
in one study, the plaintiff lost in thirty-five cases that involved only “cognized” 
(i.e., “invisible”) gender nonconforming behaviors and only won in one case.204 
When contrasted with visible stereotypes, the plaintiff won twelve times and 
only lost in three instances.205 According to some scholars, the “ultimate gender 
stereotype” is committed when homosexual employees are discriminated against 
for failing to conform to gender expectations, and it is argued that both gender 
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conforming and gender nonconforming individuals should be equalized under 
Title VII.206  
As a result, if sexual orientation discrimination is not covered under Title 
VII, plaintiffs would still likely experience different results depending on the 
extent to which their LGBT+ status is gender nonconforming. This is especially 
concerning given that identifying as LGBT+ in and of itself is already seen as 
gender nonconforming207 and given that acceptance of LGBT+ status in the U.S. 
continues to vary by region.208 LGBT+ employees – particularly those who are 
not obviously gender nonconforming – may feel compelled to remain in 
jurisdictions that are more receptive to a finding of gender nonconformity in 
LGBT+ discrimination cases or risk facing adverse employment actions simply 
as a result of their sexual orientation. A finding that sexual orientation 
discrimination is covered under Title VII would be a notable first step in 
circumventing these inevitably inconsistent applications of the law. 
Also, a plaintiff’s ability to even bring a discrimination claim in the first 
place rests largely on the information they provide to the EEOC or a state agency 
at the outset of the complaint process. Sixty-two percent of the adult population 
already thinks it is against federal law to discriminate against LGBT+ 
individuals in the workplace,209 and the current state of the law demonstrates 
that trained lawyers are not clear on the law either. If judges and lawyers are 
confused, it is unlikely a lay employee will know how to frame the facts of their 
discrimination claim when they file a charge with the EEOC or a state agency. 
The partially automated intake process may not even provide the employee with 
the requisite form if they do not answer the screening questions in a way that 
clarifies that Title VII has been violated,210 further encouraging the inconsistent 
application of employment discrimination law by allowing some plaintiffs to 
proceed to the next step of the complaint process while leaving others with 
absolutely no recourse. 
Unfortunately, the current legal landscape “sends a strong message that it is 
acceptable to discriminate against employees based on their constitutionally 
protected love for a person of the same sex.”211 This contrasts with the primary 
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objective of Title VII: to avoid harm.212 Furthermore, studies demonstrate that 
workplace discrimination subsides when legal rules clearly prohibit it.213 The 
Supreme Court has the power to decide whether this country will continue to 
send the message that discrimination against LGBT+ employees is okay. 
CONCLUSION 
While protections for the LGBT+ community are on the rise, employment 
discrimination law continues to lag. The Supreme Court ruled three decades ago 
that discrimination claims based on a theory of gender nonconformity are 
protected under Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition. However, courts were 
then left to determine whether sexual orientation discrimination should be 
afforded the same protections under Title VII. This question has proven to be far 
less clear, resulting in inconsistently applied law across the United States. If the 
inconsistency persists, the Supreme Court should intervene and rule once and 
for all that sexual orientation discrimination is protected under Title VII, since 
there is always some level of gender nonconformity present in sexual orientation 
discrimination cases. Courts should cease attempts to draw a distinction between 
sexual orientation and gender nonconformity where no distinction logically 
exists and should side with the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Seventh 
Circuits in interpreting that sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited under 
Title VII. This will result in a clearer standard, more consistently applied law, 
and greater fairness for employees across the country. 
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